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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES
Lester B. Orfield*
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."'
The fourth amendment was intended to protect the right
to privacy; that is to say, the right of undisturbed enjoyment
of one's property, the right to shut the doors to officers of the
state.2  "The second, and intimately related protection, is self-
protection; the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as
its design the securing of information which may be used to
effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property. '3
Four rationales 4 have been said by the Supreme Court to
underlie the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases: (1)
providing the victim with an effective remedy ;5 preventing the
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. On search and seizure see LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937) ; MCCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE 153-54, 291-96 (1954); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 167-240
(1959) ; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 23442 (1963) ; ROTTSCHAEFER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74149 (1939); SOWLE, POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 75-1.28 (1.962) ; VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURE AND IMMUNITIES (1961) ;
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ; Symposium, 52 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 245-92 (1961).
2. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1.949) ; Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14, 17 (1948) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1949). See
ROTTSCIAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741 (1939); Note, 28 U. Cm. L. REV.
664, 667 (1961).
3. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
4. Note, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1159, 1165-70 (1957).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ; Connolly v. Medalie,
58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
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government from profiting by its own wrong ;6 preserving the
integrity of the court ;7 and deterring the police from similar
future misconduct.8
Recent studies reveal that the exclusionary rule is not ap-
plied in other countries, or if applied, only in a fragmentary
sort of way.9
The common law rule was that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means through which
the party has obtained the evidence. 10 The federal doctrine
excluding evidence seized in violation of search and seizure
laws is a comparatively modern one. The federal doctrine goes
back to Boyd v. United States," decided in 1886. The Supreme
Court reversed a trial court ruling compelling a defendant to
produce a self-incriminating invoice pursuant to a statute. The
Court could have decided the case on the ground of self-incrimi-
nation in violation of the fifth amendment. But the Court
stated that even though there was no search, "compulsory pro-
duction of private books and papers . . . is the equivalent of a
search and seizure, and an unreasonable search and seizure,
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 1 2  The Court
also stated that the "admission in evidence" of the invoice was
an "unconstitutional proceeding.' 1 3  In so stating, the Court
seemed to imply that violation of the fourth amendment required
the result, as did violation of the fifth.' 4
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-485 (1928) (dissenting opin-
ion).
7. Id. at 469, 471 (dissenting opinion) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
150 (1954) (dissenting opinion). Four Justices dissented in both these cases. See
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960).
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 135, 137 (1954) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31, 40 (1949) ; Henderson
v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956).
9. SOWLE, POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 104-28 (1962). The
studies cover Canada, England, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Norway.
See also Symposium, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 271-92 (1961). Compare Kami-
sar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some Facts and Theories, 53 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 171, 183 n.95 (1962).
10. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For discussion of the law
up to 1921, see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HRV. L. REv. 361
(1921).
12. 116 U.S. 635 (1855). A separate opinion by Justice Miller pointed out
that there was no search or seizure. Id. at 639.
13. 116 U.S. 638 (1855).
14. Arguing in favor of the interrelation, see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 446, 457 (1962) (dissenting opinion) ; ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 748-49 (1939) ; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1928) ; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Sei-
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The Supreme Court soon rejected in large part the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment to an order to produce a docu-
ment.15 But in 1950 the Court came back to this view.1" In
1904 the Court seemed to repudiate the view that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible.17
The latter view was followed for ten years. 18 In 1914 the
Court returned to the doctrine of the Boyd case. 19 The Court
held that a constitutional principle was involved. But many
subsequent cases speak in terms of a court-adopted rule of evi-
dence. 20  Thus it would seem at least arguable that Congress
may change the rule and that the Court may also change it by
judicial decisions or rule of Court.
The Weeks doctrine does not apply to all evidence illegally
obtained. It applies where the fourth amendment is violated.
What about federal statutes on search and seizure? Possibly
it also applies here. In one case the Supreme Court applied
the exclusionary rule21 where a federal statute was violated. 22
It should be noted that the fourth amendment does not pro-
hibit all searches and seizures. What it prohibits is "unreason-
able" searches and seizures.
zures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 367 (1921). Cf. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 22-
33, 182 (1959) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 32, § 2264, at 381-84 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1930) ; Meltzer, Required Rec-
ords, The Mcarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.
CI. L. REV. 687, 699-701 (1951) ; Note, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 692-98 (1961).
15. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 n.42 (1948) ; Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
72, 76 (1906) ; ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904).
16. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950).
17. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904).
18. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910) ; United States v. Wilson,
163 Fed. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) ; Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 Fed. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 396, 398 (1914).
20. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 33 (1949). See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 5 n.13, 170, 245-46(1959); 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 33 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in Federal Law Since 1948, 41 IOWA
L. REV. 67, at 67-68 (1955).
21. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306, 313 (1958), noted 25 BROOK.
L. REV. 133 (1958). See also Jones v. United States, 304 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.
1962), noted 8 S.D. L. REV. 127 (1963). See also Blakey, The Rule of Announce-
ment and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112
U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964).
22. The statute was 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958) on breaking doors to execute a
search warrant. See Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man'8 Land in the Crim-
inal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 474, 500-03 (1961).
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CORPORATIONS
A corporation may invoke the exclusionary rule, 23 although
as to the privilege against self-incrimination it is without pro-
tection.
SEARCH BY STATE OR LOCAL OFFICERS
An illegal search and seizure by state or other local officers
has the consequence of exclusion of the evidence so obtained
in federal criminal proceedings. 24  This is true even though
no federal officers took part in the violation, and a fortiori if
they did. 25  The contrary doctrine of the Weeks case was re-
jected.
INJUNCTION AGAINST FEDERAL OFFICER
A federal court may enjoin a federal officer from produc-
ing in a state criminal proceeding evidence obtained by him
in violation of the fourth amendment.2 An invalid federal
warrant was involved. But later the Court held that where
there had been an arrest and search by federal narcotic agents
acting without a warrant no injunction should issue.2 7
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is applied to
illegal search and seizure, that is to say, the federal courts will
exclude evidence obtained as an indirect result of the illegal
search. Justice Holmes stated that the protection afforded was
not merely that "evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this
does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and
23. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946); Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ; Hale v. Ilenkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ; Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1961).
Only a slight doubt was cast on this in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 651 (1950).
24. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), noted 74 HARv. L. REv.
147, 46 IOWA L. REV. 169, 55 N.W.U.L. REv. 525, 39 TEX. L. REV. 347, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1. The case followed in Williams v United States, 323 F.2d 90,
93 n.3 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Foster v. United States, 281 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1960).
25. The participation doctrine was first laid down in Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927). See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 210-14 (1959).
26. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), noted 56 COLUM. L. REV. 940,
70 HARV. L. REV. 145, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 1176, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 135. See Lucas
v. Mayo, 222 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
27. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), affirming 275 F.2d 937 (7th
Cir. 1960), noted 75 HARV. L. REV. 363. Three Justices dissented. See Orfield,
The Scope of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 38 U. DETROIT L.J. 173,
188 (1960).
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inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independ-
ent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowl-
edge gained by the government's own wrong cannot be used
in the way proposed. '28 The government could not use the orig-
inal documents nor any knowledge obtained from the originals,
the photostats, or the copies. It has been held that an officer
may not testify to his observation, during illegal search, that
a coat with a missing button was on the premises. 29 In 1963
the Supreme Court noted with approval the "independent
source" doctrine. It expressly declined to make admissibility
depend on whether the challenged evidence "would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police."30  The
Court looked at the degree of attenuation between the primary
illegality and the acquisition of evidence. 31
Where officers investigating a minor auto accident came
to the home of a person reasonably suspected, knocked but re-
ceived no reply, entered without violence but without consent,
and persuaded the owner to come down from upstairs, testimony
against him by the officers as to incriminating statements which
he voluntarily made after reaching the lower floor was held
improperly admitted.3 2  This is a debatable holding.83 . There
could have been no objection if the officer, remaining outside,
had called into the house and achieved the same result. Fur-
thermore, the disclosure was in the realm of intangibles. The
fourth amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects,
but not conversation. The Supreme Court has held that the
exclusionary rule does not make inadmissible evidence of oral
statements secured surreptitiously or by means of modern de-
tecting apparatus. 34 In one case the defendants contended that
28. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 393 (1920),
noted 20 CoLUM. L. REV. 484, 33 HARV. L. REV. 869, 29 YALE L.J. 553. Two
Justices dissented. See in accord United States v. Wallace & Tierman Co., 336
U.S. 793, 796 (1949); Wagman v. Arnold, 257 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1958);
United States v. Cutshall, 218 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) ; United States
v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Fowler,
17 F.R.D. 499, 503 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
29. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See MA-
GUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 219, 246 (1959).
30. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
31. See also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
32. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (1940), noted 9 GEo.
WASHr. L. REV. 480, 14 So. CALIF. L. REV. 477. See also Work v. United States,
243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746, 747 (5th
Cir. 1958).
33. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 188-189 (1959).
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ; On Lee v. United States,
843 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Lopez v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1381, 1387 (1963).
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interruption of the freedom of movement was an illegal arrest
and therefore statements made to the police thereafter were
the fruits of illegal police activity and should be excluded. This
contention was rejected by a federal district court. 5
In 1963 the Supreme Court for the first time extended the
"fruits" doctrine to verbal statements obtained as a result of
illegal police action by way of illegal arrest and search and
seizure.8 6 The case does not directly or clearly hold that the re-
sult would be the same in the case of an illegal arrest unaccom-
panied by an illegal search. T
DOCUMENTS OR CHATTELS HAVING EVIDENTIAL VALUE
Private documents or other chattels of the defendant
wanted by the government only for their evidential value are
not subject to seizure. It makes no difference that they are
not contraband nor tools nor fruits of crime. In 1932 the Su-
preme Court stated by Justice Butler: "Respondent's papers
were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime
of which respondents were accused and suspected. They could
not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search
warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing
such things and disclosing exactly where they were."88 Such
searches are to be distinguished from "searches such as those
made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take
property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover
property concealed to avoid payment of duties for which it is
liable, and from searches such as those made for the seizure
of counterfeit coins, burglar's tools, gambling paraphernalia
and illicit liquor in order to prevent commission of crime."3 9
35. United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 83-84 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). See
Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating State-
ments: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. OF ILL.
L. FORUm 78; Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 454, 457 (1961).
36. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963), noted 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 637, 77 HARV. L. REV. 117-19. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States:
A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L, REV. 483, 516-550 (1963). See also Fahy
v. Connecticut, 84 Sup. Ct. 229, 232 (1963) ; Lopez v. United States, 83 Sup.
Ct. 1381, 1392, 1399 (1963) ; United States v. Zimple, 318 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir.
1963) ; United States v. Williams, 219 F. Supp. 666, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
37. See 2 VAsHBURN L.J. 292, 296 (1963). Compare 48 MINN. L. REV. 792
(1964).
38. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932).
39. Id. at 465-66. It is concluded at 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 319 (1953) that the
rule originated in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 293, 310 (1921). See also
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 183 (1959) ; Annots., 129 A.L.R. 1291, 1296, 1300-
01 (1940). It has been concluded that most writers are critical of the rule.
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Fifteen years later Chief Justice Vinson stated: "This Court
has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evi-
dentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized
either under the authority of a search warrant or during the
course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand,
those objects which may validly be seized including the instru-
mentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits
of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of
the person arrested might be effected, and property the pos-
session of which is a crime." 40  A fortiori the same is true
where there is no search warrant and no arrest.41 There may
be search where the documents are instruments for accomplish-
ing an offense.42  The grounds for the above rule seem ob-
scure. 43  State courts have not accepted the limitation.44
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
A subpoena duces tecum which is too sweeping may violate
the fourth amendment. 45  In determining whether a subpoena
is so broad as to constitute unreasonable search and seizure, the
purpose and scope of the investigation being carried on must
be considered. 46  According to one court: "In extrinsic aspect,
a subpoena duces tecum may be so broad in its scope as to go
substantially beyond the bounds of apparent relevance in rela-
tion to an immediate pursuit and so be unreasonable. Or it may
be so onerous in its burden as to be out of proportion to the
end sought .... In intrinsic aspect, it may involve an improper
intrusion into what is, in relation to the purpose of the investi-
gation, purely private or privileged papers. ' '47 A subpoena has
been held to violate a corporation's rights under the fourth
Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 J. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 177
(1962). Compare Note, 45 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 51, 53-54, 61 (1954).
40. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
41. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir 1958).
42. United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 94 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 82
Sup. Ct. 675 (1962) (guest checks in a brothel) ; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 237-38 (1960).
43. Some cases attribute the limitation to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264, n.44 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
44. See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE oF GUILT 183 (1959); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2184a, at 45-46 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
45. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). See also Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 622, 634 (1886) ; In re Shaw, 172 Fed. 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) ;
Orfield, Subpoena v. Federal Criminal Procedure, 13 ALA. L. REV. 1, 28-30
(1960) ; ROTTSCIIAEFER, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 746 (1939).
46. United States v. Hopps, 215 F. Supp. 734, 754 (D. Md. 1962).
47. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
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amendment where issued solely on the basis of information
derived by the government through an invalid seizure of the
documents directed to be produced. 48  In other words a grand
jury cannot use a subpoena to give illegal color to an illegal
search. Where a subpoena was issued by a grand jury which
was illegally constituted and the indictment was dismissed, the
subpoena amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure, and
the witnesses were entitled to have the objects produced in re-
sponse to the subpoena returned. So a trial court held.49 But
the Supreme Court rejected illegal composition of a grand jury
as an adequate foundation for argument of improper construc-
tive search.50 In one case the defendant obeyed a subpoena and
produced material at the place and time set for trial. The trial
was postponed and the material was impounded but with leave
to inspect granted the government after opportunity given the
defendant to present specific objections. The court held that
there was no unlawful search and seizure.-"
REQUIRED RECORDS
Professor Rottschaefer has pointed out that a claim is fre-
quently made that the fourth amendment "is violated by stat-
utes that require those engaged in certain businesses to file re-
ports and submit their books and records to inspection by pub-
lic authorities. These requirements are held valid whenever
reasonably proper for the public control and regulation of any
business activities. 5 12 In most respects the fourth amendment
problems are the same whether the records are required or non-
required, as it is the method of obtaining the records, rather
than their contents that is crucial.5 3  Where records are con-
tained only in agency files the fourth amendment would seem
not to apply.5 4 But agency examination on the record keepers'
premises under a subpoena duces tecum or an inspection order
could conceivably be an unreasonable search.5 There should be
48. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
49. In re Wallace & Tierman Co., 76 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. R.I. 1948).
50. United States v. Wallace & Tierman Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949). See MA-
GUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 185-87 (1959).
51. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 116 (6th Cir. 1944).
The case was considered by the Supreme Court on other issues only. 328 U.S.
781 (1946).
52. ROTTSCHIAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 747 (1939). He cited Bartlett
Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1933). See also Note, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 340, 346-49 (1954).
53. Troy Laundry Co. v. Wirtz, 155 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1946).
54. Isbrandteen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 145 (1937).
55. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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a reasonably particularized statement of the records to be in-
spected. 6 The particular records which are demanded must be
relevant to the purpose for which the inquiry was made. Sev-
eral cases have suggested that because records are required they
may be searched without any legal process.57
In recent years many cases have arisen as to the rights
of a taxpayer to withhold records during a tax investigation.5 8
The question has arisen as to production of records of a labor
union.5 9 A labor union may claim protection under the fourth
amendment even though it may not under the fifth.
CONTRABAND GOODS
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ex-
pressly authorizes the seizure of stolen or embezzled property,
and of weapons used to commit an offense.60 At one time it
seems to have been the view that unlawful seizure of contra-
band goods was not within the exclusionary rule. The present
view is that while the defendant has no right to the return of
such goods he may demand their suppression.61 A motion to
suppress was allowed as to stolen radios seized as an incident
of an unlawful arrest.62
PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A motion before trial to suppress evidence illegally seized
was first made in 1908. The court approved the procedure, but
denied the motion on the ground that there had been no un-
56. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 337 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
57. Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945) ; Bowles v. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co., 55 F. Supp.
9, 12 (W.D. Ky. 1944). But see Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 591
(1946). See criticism, 68 IIARv. L. REV. 340, 34849 (1954).
58. See DeReuil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963
DUKE L. J. 472; Note, 42 BOSTON U.L. REV. 227, 23441 (1962).
59. Mitchell v. Truck Drivers Union, 191 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D. Mich.
1961), noted 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 163.
60. See the legislative references in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
618-20 (1946), appendix to dissent by Justice Frankfurter. See also Kaplan,
Search and Seizure, A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
474, 477-79 (1961) ; 45 J. GRIM. L., C. & P.S. 51, 53 (1954) ; State v. Chinn,
373 P.2d 392, 399, 402-05 (Ore. 1962) citing many federal cases.
61. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951) ; Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948), noted 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1257; In re Fried,
161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913,
916 (S.D. Calif. 1959) ; United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D.D.C.
1957).
62. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). Compare United States
v. DeCiccio, 190 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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lawful seizure. 63 In 1911 a court granted such a motion.64  The
Supreme Court stated that the lower court could grant such a
motion not only because of the constitutional privilege, but be-
cause of the court's inherent power to correct abuses in the cases
of its own officers. 65
The early cases protecting a defendant against illegal search
and seizure stressed that the defendant had made a pretrial
motion.66 Several cases held that objection at the trial came
too late. 67  But it was early held that objection before trial is
not necessary if the defendant objects as soon as he knows of
the illegal seizure. 68 In this case a pilferer of papers surprised
the defendant by appearing as a witness to the abstraction
which had previously not been suspected. There need be no
objection before trial when trial developments show the un-
contested and clear illegality. 9 The same is true if the defend-
ant claims that he never possessed the property.70 In 1958 the
Supreme Court upheld language of the trial judge that if de-
fendants "have reason to believe that illegally obtained material
is being used or may be used against them, they can object at
that time."' 71
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
continues the right of the defendant to object at the trial. It
provides: "The motion shall be made before trial or hearing
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was
not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."
The trial judge often is reluctant to exercise this discre-
63. United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1908). See Fraen.
kel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361, 371 (1921).
64. United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
65. Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. 549, 555 (1911) ; Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556,
558 (1911).
66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 387-88, 393, 396, 398 (1914). See
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 295 (1954) ; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 233 (1959) ;
Edwards, Reasonable Protests Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 37
MINN. L. REV. 188 (1953) ; Annots., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 583 (1956).
67. Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927) ; United States v. Wer-
necke, 138 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1943).
68. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921).
69. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921).
70. Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34-35, 51 A.L.R. 409 (1925). But
in Scoggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1953) it held that the de-
fendant by denying possession waived the right to suppression. The court cited
Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
71. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 354 (1958).
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tion.72 This is particularly true in those cases in which the
government may appeal from the suppression order.7 3
In one case the defendant was allowed to raise the question
for the first time after trial and conviction.7 4 It would seem
that this goes too far in protecting the defendant.75 The courts
of appeals will not review the matter under the plain error rule,
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, where
the defendant offers no reason for his nonaction.76
Where a judge denies a motion to suppress he may revise
his decision.77  But transfer to another judge for such revision
is probably not proper.78
Where the defendant loses out on his motion to suppress,
he need not reiterate his objection at the trial in order to pre-
serve his rights on appeal.79 But conceivably this is not true
if the defendant is able to make a stronger showing at the
trial than he was earlier.80
AREA OF SEARCH
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."8'
72. United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904.
73. Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873. For the statute of 1956 allowing appeal in narcotics cases
see 18 U.S.C. § 1404 (1956).
74. United States v. Asendio, 171 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1948), noted 28
NED. L. REV. 631 (1949), 28 TEXAS L. REv. 273 (1949).
75. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 295 (1954). See Williams v. United States, 323
F.2d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Watts, 319 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Di Donato, 301 F.2d 383, 384 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 82 Sup. Ct. 1554; Billeci v. United States, 290 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
Smith v. United States, 252 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Az Din v. United States,
232 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 630; Cradle v. United States, 178 F.2d 962,
965 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
76. Gray v. United States, 311 F.2d 126, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Gendron v.
United States, 295 F.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1961), Compare Sanchez v. United
States, 311 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1962).
77. Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See the
full discussion in United States v. Koenig, 290 F.2d 166, 172 n.10 (5th Cir. 1961).
78. United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert denied,
358 U.S. 873, 913. See Notes, 35 TuL. L. REV. 794, 807-14 (1961), 76 HARV. L.
REv. 173, 174 (1962).
79. Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
80. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312 (1921).
81. See the discussion of this language in MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 187-
89 (1959).
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The search and seizure provision is designed to protect pri-
vate areas. The protection "is not extended to the open fields,"
hence evidence seized without a warrant near a house is admissi-
ble. 2 Search of a suitcase found on a sidewalk and disclaimed
by the defendant is valid.8  But protection extends to a business
office. 4  It extends to evidence obtained in a search without
a warrant of the defendant's desk in a government office."-"
Evidence gotten by driving a spike microphone through the
defendant's wall was excluded.8 6  The Supreme Court held for
the first time that evidence gathered by electronic eavesdrop-
ping could violate the fourth amendment.8 7
The fourth amendment extends protection to sealed letters
and packages in the mails.88 These may be opened and exam-
ined only in response to a valid search warrant. Letters writ-
ten by a prisoner may be opened by the warden under the dis-
ciplinary rules of a prison.8 9 As to a letter written to a prisoner
by his lawyer no improper seizure was found because of the
right of prison authorities to censor mail.90 But the court re-
fused to allow the letter to be used in disciplinary proceedings
against the lawyer who wrote it.
It is clear that the search of an automobile may come within
the protection of the fourth amendment. Where an automobile
82. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). See also United States
v. Shea, 324 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Young, 322 F.2d 443
(4th Cir. 1963) ; Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 1957)
(fence) ; Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873; Koth v. United States, 16 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1926);
United States v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; United States v.
Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
83. United States v. Smith, 68 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1946).
84. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Walker
v. United States, 225 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1955).
85. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951), noted 20 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 108 (1951), 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 201 (1952). Compare United
States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1944).
86. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961), noted 75 HARV.
L. REV. 184, 40 N.C. L. REV. 115, 46 VA. L. REV. 995. See Rogers, The Fourth
Amendment and Evidence Obtained by a Government Agent's Trespass, 42 NEE.
L. REV. 166 (1962).
87. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), noted 77 HARv. L. REV. 111
(1963) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
88. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) ; Em parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1942). Compare Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 820, 61
A.L.R.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1957), noted 10 OKLA. L. REV. 324.
89. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21 (1919).
90. In re Bull, 123 F. Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954). As to "mail watch" of
exteriors of letters see United States v. Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960) ;
United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 937.
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containing liquor was searched without a search warrant it was
held that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported
as distinguished from a dwelling house may be searched for
without a warrant if the officer has reasonable or probable
cause for believing that the vehicle contains such contraband
liquor. 91 Arrest and search of the occupant of an automobile
was held illegal as there was no probable cause.92  The search
was not justified as incident to a lawful arrest nor as incident
to the search of a vehicle reasonably believed to be carrying
contraband. The doctrine favorable to the government of the
liquor cases did not necessarily apply to other cases as there
was congressional legislation for the liquor cases. In a case in
which contraband radios were seized as an incident of an illegal
arrest the Court stated: "The fact that the suspects were in an
automobile is not enough. Carroll v. United States ... liberalized
the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved.
But that decision merely relaxed the requirements for a war-
rant on grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the
need for probable cause." 93 The Carroll case is not applicable
only in liquor cases.
94
STANDING TO SUPPRESS
In general for the constitutional provision to apply it must
91. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). Two Justices dis-
sented from affirmance of the conviction. In a dictum in United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), a motorboat on the high seas was assimilated to an
automobile.
92. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 584 (1948), noted 14 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 281, 38 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 629, 13 Mo. L. REV. 302, 15 U. CH. L. REV.
950, 3 Wyo. L.J. 94. Where probable cause for the search exists search without
a warrant is valid. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165 (1949), noted
29 B.U.L. REV. 540, 23 So. CAL. L. REV. 242 (1950). Three Justices dissented.
See Note, Search of Motor Vehicles for Intoxicating Liquor8 Without Search
Warrant, 30 N.C.L. REV. 421 (1952).
93. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959), noted 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 661 (1960). Two Justices dissented. There were reversals in the follow-
ing cases: Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1960)
(ample time to obtain a search warrant) ; United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924,
929 (7th Cir. 1960) (automobile was not in movement nor occupied by the de-
fendant) ; Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1959) (nar-
cotics). A motion to suppress was granted in Lucas v. Mayo, 222 F. Supp. 513
(S.D. Tex. 1963) ; United States v. Darby, 201 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
Convictions were upheld in United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.
1963) ; United States v. Thomas, 319 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1963) ; United States
v. Haley, 321 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. One 1957 Ford
Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F.2d 21, 25 (10th Cir. 1959) (yet was ample time
to obtain a search warrant) ; Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
94. Armada v. United States, 319 F.2d 793, 797 (5th Cir. 1963).
1959) (narcotics). A motion to suppress was denied in United States v. Copes,
191 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1961) ; United States v. Mazzio, 162 F. Supp. 935,
937 (D. N.J. 1958).
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be the privacy of the defendant which is invaded . 5  It follows
that evidence gotten in violation of the rights of third persons
only will not be excluded upon application of the defendant6
The rule of exclusion does not apply to property not owned by
the defendantY7  Protection has been given to a guest of a
lodger.98 Protection was given where the defendant's property
was the object of an illegal search of a hotel room rented by
third persons, but the defendant had been given a key and
permission to use the room.9  A search is valid where the
defendant has abandoned the hotel room searched. 100 In 1960
the Supreme Court stated broadly that "anyone legitimately
on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality
by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed
to be used against him."'' 1  A defendant might object even
though he was only a guest in an apartment and even though
he did not claim ownership of the drugs seized. The decision
left open the question of the standing of an absentee owner of
the premises, and of the owner of property seized from the
possession of a third party. And it was not clear that the deci-
sion was based on constitutional grounds rather than super-
visory power or on Rule 41(e) 102 One who had gratuitously
bailed his automobile to a friend for a short time has standing
to challenge a search thereof. 03
95. McCormick, Evidence 296 (1954) ; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 214-17
(1959). See criticism, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 154 (1948). See also Edwards, Stand-
ing To Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 N.W.U.L. REV. 471 (1952).
96. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1910) (search warrant issues
against socialist headquarters and not the defendant).
97. Bourjois Co. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 190 (1937).
98. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948), noted 62 HARV.
L. REV. 1229 (1949), 47 MICH. L. REV. 1009, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 728 (1949).
See 58 YALE L.J. 144, 154-58 (1948).
99. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 50 (1951), noted 50 Micii. L. REV.
931, 31 NEB. L. REV. 618, 27 NOTRE DAMm LAW. 273, 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 364
(1952). Two Justices dissented.
100. Abel v. United States, 263 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). Four Justices dis-
sented.
101. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), noted 74 HAEV. L.
REV. 151 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REV. 444 (1961), 14 Sw. L.J. 521 (1960), 14
VAND. L. REV. 418 (1960), 15 Wyo. L.J. 218 (1961) ; Villano v. United States,
310 F.2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (search of desk at place of employment in-
valid); United States v. Holt, 306 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1962) (guest in apart-
ment) Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650, 651 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Contreras
v. United States, 291 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Cooperstein,
221 F. Supp. 522, 524 (D. Mass. 1963) ; United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp.
942, 944 (N.D. Calif. 1963) ; United States v. Blitz, 199 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.
N.Y. 1961) (licensee on premises with permission of owner) ; United States v.
Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
102. At 362 U.S. 257, 260, 264, the court seemed to rely on rule 41(e).
103. United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir. 1962), noted 23
MD. L. REV. 93, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 95.
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In 1963 the Supreme Court adhered to its view that the
defendant must have standing to object.10 4  Justice Black ruled
that one who is a mere custodian of records cannot invoke the
fourth or fifth amendments to resist an order to produce such
records.10 5
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Evidence obtained by search incidental to a lawful arrest 10 6
may be a reasonable search although made without a search
warrant.'0 7  Dicta leading to the rule go back to the Weeks case
in 1914 announcing the exclusionary rule itself. 08 The Court
stated: "What then is the present case? Before answering that
inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion
to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on
the part of the government, always recognized under English
and American law to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many
cases."' 19 The cases referred only to searches of the person.
The only authorities cited were a single English decision and
two text writers."0 In 1925 the Supreme Court stretched the
rule to cover search of the house where the arrest is made."'
Two years later the Court applied the rule to a ledger and cer-
104. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963), criticized 77
HARV. L. REV. 118 (1963). See Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Questions
of Standing, 50 GEo. L.J. 585 (1962).
105. Owen v. Kennedy, 84 Sup. Ct. 12 (1963).
106. As to the law of arrest, see MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 168-69, 191-93
(1959) ; Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 474, 490-05 (1961) ; Orfield, Warrant of Arrest and Summons onl
Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 27 U. CINO. L. REV. 1 (1958).
It has been held that the search may be incidental to an arrest for a state
offense. Hart v. United States, 316 F.2d 916, 920 (5th Cir. 1963) ; United
States v. Fortier, 207 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1962).
107. See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 168-69, 191-93 (1950); Annots., 54
A.L.R. 424 (1927), 4 L.Ed.2d 1982 (1960). The rule is criticized by Reynard,
The Right of Privacy, in FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 85,
93-101 (1959) ; Reynard, Freedom from Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitution of Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 289-306 (1950).
108. How the dicta expanded is pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950). See also Kaplan, Search and
Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 474, 489-99
(1961) ; Notes, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 302, 305-18 (1962), 45 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 51, 56-59 (1954) ; 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 159 (1959) ; 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664,
682-92 (1961).
109. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
110. See, however, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947).
111. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 32 (1925). Compare the
opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202,
203 (2d Cir. 1926). See Note, 35 YALE L.J. 612 (1926).
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tain utility bills found in a closet on the premises. 1 2  Later
the Court seemed to restrict search and seizure to those things
which were on the person or in plain view in the premises in
which the arrest was made. 11 3  In turn these cases were not
followed.1 4 Then the Court swung to its more liberal position
stressing the element of ample time to obtain a search war-
rant. 1 5
In 1950 the Court swung back to the more conservative
approach. A search of the defendant's one-room office, includ-
ing desk, safe, and file cabinets was held to be reasonable.",6
The Court overruled the prior holding that a search warrant
must be obtained if there is adequate opportunity to procure
it.- 7 In 1959 the Court held that where an agent had probable
cause for arresting the defendant for a narcotics violation,
heroin found clutched in the defendant's hand in his raincoat
pocket and a needle found in his valise were admissible.""
In 1960 the Supreme Court referred favorably to the earlier
cases allowing search incident to a legal arrest."9 Search was
of the hotel room in which the defendant was arrested and in
the adjoining bathroom. Possibly this case indicates that the
permissible scope of search incidental to arrest will return more
nearly to that which is necessary for the safety of those who
are arresting and the safekeeping of the arrested party2
Professor Maguire concludes that an arresting officer "ought
to be allowed to search his prisoner and the immediate vicinity
for weapons and for devices which might aid escape; he ought
probably to make some search for the purpose of guarding the
proceeds of crime, contraband, and important material evidence
112. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
113. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463 (1932); Go-Bart Im-
porting Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
114. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
115. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ; Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948), noted 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1257, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1452; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
116. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) noted 36 CORN.
L.Q. 125, 36 IowA L. REV. 142, 10 LA. L. REV. 546, 48 MICH. L. REV. 128, 25
N.Y.U.L. REv. 647, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 304.
117. This is still the law. United States v. Williams, 219 F. Supp. 666, 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
118. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
119. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960). Four Justices dis-
sented. The case is noted 74 HARV. L. REV. 154, 59 MICH. L. REV. 128, 25
N.Y.U.L. REV. 647, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 304.
120. 74 HARV. L. REV. 154, 158 (1960).
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from loss, destruction or perversion.' 12 1 In 1963 the Supreme
Court expressly disclaimed any opinion as to whether a search
warrant should be obtained where the search is incidental to
a lawful arrest.1 2
2
Suppose a search incidental to arrest. May this include
matters of evidential value? It may as to search of the per-
son.1 23  A federal case seems to intimate otherwise. 124 But the
search was of the apartment of an absentee whose arrest was
being attempted and not of his clothing or person.
The right of search incidental to arrest may supplement
more limited authority for search embodied in a search war-
rant. 125  In one case there was a search warrant for liquors
and articles for their manufacture coupled with arrest of a
person other than the defendant in charge of the premises. The
search disclosed a ledger and bills not covered by the warrant
but nevertheless seized. The search and seizure was upheld
on various grounds, one being possession and control by the
arrested person as to the ledger and possibly the bills. 2 Con-
traband may be seized in a search incident to arrest even
though the items had no relationship to the crime for which
the arrest was made. 27 In a recent case it was held that in-
strumentalities of crime may be seized although the warrant
for the search does not list them.128
It has been held that a search is invalid where officers with
reasonable grounds for arrest searched before making an ar-
rest. 29 There are contrary holdings in Oregon, 1 0 California,131
121. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 193 (1959). See United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 61, 71-73 (1950).
122. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480 n.8 (1963).
123. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 193 n.36 (1959).
124. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
125. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 190 n.30 (1959).
126. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927), noted 28 COLIIM.
L. REV. 383, 2 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 196.
127. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1957) ; United States v.
Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1962); Woo Lai Chun v. United States,
274 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118,
122 (9th Cir. 1944). See contra: United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775
(E.D. Tenn. 1961) (arrest not involved).
128. Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (arrest not
involved).
129. United States v. Hamm, 163 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1958). See also
United States v. Haley, 321 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Waller, 108 F. Supp. 450, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1952) ; United States v. Sully, 56 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
130. State v. Chinn, 373 P.2d 392, 397, 408 (Ore. 1962). One judge dissented.
131. Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 2d 356, 337 P.2d 201, 202
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and in the Ninth Circuit.13 2
Where there is an arrest for a misdemeanor based on a
warrant of arrest, there may still be a valid arrest for a felony
where the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant had committed a felony; and incidental to such arrest
there may be a search.13 3
If an arrest is merely a pretext for making a search, the
search is invalid even though the arrest may be lawful.1 4
The search incident to arrest must remain within proper
limits. It must be incidental in fact. It was held excessive
to seize the entire contents of a house and move the seized prop-
erty over two hundred miles.13 5
Several recent lower federal court decisions have permitted
a wide range for searching. 3 6  Officers were allowed to search
a defendant's apartment after arresting the defendant in an
automobile some distance away.13 7  After an arrest without
a warrant on a narcotics charge the agents were permitted
to search the entire upstairs and ground floor of the house.3 8
In one case the home was invaded although the arrest took place
in the yard of the home.3 9
It has been seen that there may be reasonable searches
(1959) ; People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 648, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (1955). See
Collings, Towards Workable Rules of Search and Seizure, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 421,
441-42 (1962).
132. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 287 n.8 (9th Cir. 1963)
Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 876.
133. United States v. O'Donnell, 209 F. Supp. 332, 333 (D. Me. 1962).
But see Clay v. United States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1956). See Orfield,
Warrant of Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure,
27 U. CINc. L. REV. 1, 29, 50 (1958).
134. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961) (traffic
warrant used as pretext to search the defendant for marijuana cigarettes). See
also United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739, 741 (6th Cir. 1963) ; McKnight v.
United States, 183 F.2d 977, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Note, Search Incident to
Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 WIs. L. REV. 347; Note, 14 HASTINGS L.J.
459 (1963). Compare United States v. Mathews, 23 F.R.D. 169, 170 (S.D. Ind.
1959).
135. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), noted 46 GEO. L.J. 534.
Justices Burton and Clark dissented.
136. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 192 n.34 (1959) ; Way, Increasing Scope
of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261.
137. United States v. Jackson, 149 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D.D.C. 1957), reversed
on other grounds, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Rhodes v. United
States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955). But see United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D.
499, 501 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
138. Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
139. Clifton v. United States, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).
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under a search warrant and without a warrant incidental to
arrest. Are there other types of reasonable search? There
may be search of automobiles without a search warrant or a
ground for arrest where the automobile is believed to carry
contraband. 140 The Supreme Court has suggested that a search
of premises without a search warrant might be upheld in "ex-
ceptional circumstances" as where evidence or contraband was
threatened with destruction or removal.' 4 ' "Belief, however
well founded, that an article is concealed in a dwelling house
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant.' ' 42  Consent of a landlord to entry does not justify
a search without a search warrant.14 3 A state lease forfeiture
statute made no difference.
IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANT
In some situations evidence gotten by illegal search and
seizure may be used by the government to impeach a defend-
ant. In a narcotics case the defendant was asked by his counsel
on direct examination whether he had sold narcotics to anyone.
He answered: "I have never sold narcotics to anyone in my
life." It was held that the government could impeach him
by asking about heroin which had been unlawfully seized from
him in a prior proceeding. 44 The defendant had opened himself
by sweeping assertions of righteousness during the direct ex-
amination. If he had not done this the government would have
been blocked. 45
CONSENT
If the defendant consents to the search he cannot complain
later about its illegality. 146 Consent given by the wife of the
140. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
141. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), noted 1 ALA. L. Rv.
49, 38 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 629, 13 Mo. L. REV. 302, 15 U. Cm. L. REV. 950.
142. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). See also Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958).
143. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), noted 75 HAXv. L. REV.
187, 12 MERCER L. REV. 422, 37 NoTRE DAME LAW. 250. Justice Frankfurter, in
a concurring opinion would look at the circumstances of each case. 365 U.S. at
618. Justice Clark dissented.
144. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), affirming 201 F.2d
715, 717 (8th Cir. 1953), noted 68 HAEv. L. REV. 113, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 136.
See Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases,
11 KAN. L. REV. 447, 462 (1963).
145. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925).
146. United Statesv. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 1962), noted 23
MD. L. REV. 93, 36 TEMPLE L.Q. 95; Fuentes v. United States, 283 F.2d 537,
539 (9th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Bianco, 96 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938) (trial
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defendant by virtue of her marital status to search the defend-
ant's apartment is not necessarily binding.147  Consent obtained
by misrepresentation may not be binding. 148  There is a bind-
ing consent when the taxpayer voluntarily turned over to the
government tax records containing incriminating evidence. 49
Consent obtained by mistake may be binding.150 The tenant
of an apartment seems to be more fully protected than a guest
or roomer in a family home.'5 Whether there is valid consent
may hinge on the personal qualities of the person giving the
consent. 5 2  A mere failure to resist does not constitute a
waiver. 5 3 Whether there was consent is a question of fact to
be determined by the trial court. 54  Where an internal revenue
agent entered the defendant's office with the defendant's con-
sent, there was no unlawful invasion of the office simply be-
cause of the agent's apparent but not real willingness to accept
a bribe, and a recording of the conversation between the def end-
ant and the agent on an electronic device which was carried
in and out of the office by the agent did not violate the fourth
amendment.155
If consent is obtained through yielding to threatened vio-
lence, it would seem that there is no binding consent, 15 6 although
where the object of the search is public property the result is
different.1 57  A number of cases appear to leave only slight
court should pass on consent). See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 228-35 (1959) ;
Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures,
33 Iowa L. REV. 472, 484-86 (1948) ; Note, 28 NEB. L. REv. 631 (1949).
147. United States v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); see
Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1097-1102 (1953) ; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317
(1921).
148. United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1960) (dictum)
United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D.D.C. 1958).
149. Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 1960).
150. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958).
151. Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 930.
152. Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1958) (timid,
ignorant person) ; Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(young pregnant wife) ; United States v. Lantrip, 74 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D.
Ark. 1948) (ignorant person).
153. United States v. Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) United
States v. Sully, 56 F. Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
154. Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 82 (9th Cir. 1962).
155. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), noted 77 HAEv. L. REV.
111. Three Justices dissented.
156. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
157. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 586-87, 591-94, 599, 623 (1946),
rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 824 (1946), noted 1 ALA. L. REV. 49, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 155, 15 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110, 37 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 413, 7 LAW
GUILD REV. 122, 45 MICH. L. REV. 605, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 432, 21 TUL. L. REv.
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room for peaceful persuasion when officers having no search
warrant but manifesting their official character express deter-
mination or desire to make a search.158 When the government
relies on waiver to validate a search, it has the burden of
proof.' 5
SEARCH BY PRIVATE PERSON
A search and seizure without a warrant by a private per-
son not acting in collusion with federal officers does not have
the consequence of exclusion of the evidence discovered in this
manner. 160 Where private individuals had stolen incriminating
documents and turned them over to the government, such docu-
ments were admissible in evidence.'' The majority asserted
lack of constitutional violation in the original taking. Justices
Brandeis and Holmes stated that the government representa-
tives were no more entitled to retain the stolen material than
the thieves from whom they received it. Notwithstanding an
illegal search and seizure the testimony of a stranger entering
premises during the search at the invitation of the occupant
is admissible. 16 2  The same rule applies where an estranged
wife turns over her husband's business records to the Internal
Revenue Service.16 3  It also applies as to voluntary statements
by a wife as to joint income tax returns, the spouses being sepa-
rated.6 4  In 1961 a federal court ruled that evidence procured
313. Three Justices dissented. Ration coupons belonging to the government were
involved. The place of search was a place of business.
158. United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United
States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958); United States v. Alberti,
120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; United States v. Minor, 117 F. Supp. 697
(E.D. Okla. 1953); United States v. Lantrip, 74 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D.
Ark. 1948). See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948).
159. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); Watson v.
United States, 249 F.2d 106, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("clear and positive testimony
that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied") ; Rigby v. United States,
247 F.2d 584, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("burden of convincing the court") ; United
States v. Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("clear and unequivocal
evidence").
160. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 210 (1959). See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d
571-73 (1956).
161. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474, 13 A.L.R. 1159 (1921),
criticized in Black, Burdeau v. McDowell: A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. REV. 32 (1932); Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 35
HARV. L. REV. 673, 700-03 (1922); 22 COLUm L. REV. 77, 20 MICH. L. REV.
353, 6 MINN. L. REV. 70, 58 YALE L.J. 158-60. It is upheld in 35 HA&v. L. REV.
84, 16 ILL. L. REV. 392, 70 U. PA. L. REV. 54, 31 YALE L.J. 335.
162. Cohen v. United States, 36 F.2d 461, 462 (3d Cir. 1929).
163. United States v. Ashby, 245 F.2d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1957). See Orfield,
The Husband-Wife Privileges in Federal Criminal Procedure, 24 OHIo ST. L.J.
144, 155 (1963).
164. United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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by a non-governmental third-party still is inadmissible. 16 5 In
1960 a court in dictum thought that the rule now covered search
by private parties.166
DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT
Indictments will probably not be dismissed on motion under
rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
ground that there has been an illegal search or seizure. 67 When
part of the evidence presented to the grand jury was privileged,
the indictment was upheld.0 8 Several cases held that when all
the evidence was privileged, the indictment should be quashed. 16 9
If there is a failure by the defendant to prove that all the evi-
dence is privileged, a plea in abatement is denied. 70 In 1956
the Supreme Court in upholding the admission of hearsay evi-
dence used language broad enough to cover illegal search and
seizure if the language of the court is given literal applica-
tion.17 1 Two years later the Court upheld an indictment against
a claim that evidence was obtained in violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 7 2 In a recent case a court refused
to dismiss an indictment based on an illegal search. 73  The
165. Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
166. Williams v. United States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960). See Note,
48 CORN. L.Q. 345, 347 n.13 (1963).
167. See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 236, n.29 (1959) ; Fraenkel, Concern-
ing Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 372 (1921); Orfield, The Fed-
eral Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 408, 441, 451 (1958-1959); Notes, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 564, 572, 573 (1960), 1963 WASn. U.L.Q. 102, 110-11.
168. Hillnan v. United States, 192 Fed. 264, 269 (9th Cir. 1911), cert. denied,
225 U.S. 699 (plea in abatement denied) ; United States v. Antonelli Fireworks
Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.N.Y. 1943) ; United States v. Harbin, 27 F.2d
892, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1928), noted 38 YA.E L.J. 680 (1929) ; United States v.
Gouled, 253 Fed. 242, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (motion to quash denied; was a
valid search warrant).
See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910). A plea in abatement
was sustained in United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 859, 862 (W.D.N.Y.
1920). See also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292 n.32 (N.D. Calif.
1952).
169. Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (1st Cir. 1922) ; United States v.
Smith, 23 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Mo. 1938) ; United States v. Yuck Kee, 281 Fed.
228 (D. Minn. 1922) ; United States v. Bush, 269 Fed. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
See Annot., 100 L.Ed 407-08 (1956).
170. Marr v. United States, 8 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 644.
171. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
172. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349 (1958).
173. United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Com-
pare Hoffritz v. United States, 240 F.2d 109, 111 n.2 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Larides
v. United States, 215 F.2d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 1954) suggesting that if a motion
to suppress is granted, an indictment based thereon may be quashed. The ques-
tion was left open in United States v. Ashby, 245 F.2d 684, 686 (5th Cir.
1957).
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court refused to speculate on the nature and quality of the evi-
dence presented. The defendant failed to prove his contention
that the indictment was based solely on evidence obtained from
the illegal search.
CIVIL LITIGATION
The exclusionary rule probably does not extend to civil liti-
gation to which the government is not a party.17 4 But if a gov-
ernmental civil proceeding is involved conceivably the rule may
be different. The exclusionary rule was not applied as to search
and seizure connected with administrative proceedings to revoke
a permit.'17 It does not apply to a civil suit to restrain collec-
tion of income taxes. 176 A court has stated that while the fourth
amendment does not apply to "particular situations in civil
cases," its "protective principle is not limited to pending crim-
inal proceedings."'1 77 There is a dictum in one case that the
principle of exclusion has been extended to civil proceedings.178
In an action to enforce a payment of liquor duties the exclu-
sionary rule was applied.'79 A marijuana tax penalty assessed
against the plaintiff without a hearing pursuant to evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure was enjoined. 80 The
criminal proceeding had been dismissed. A forfeiture judgment
was reversed because based on illegal search and seizure.' 8' The
Supreme Court in a case involving a subpoena assumed the
applicability of the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding under
the Sherman Act. 8 2 Under certain circumstances, the fourth
amendment apparently may also be utilized to render invalid a
civil tax assessment. 8 3 In a much annotated case the New York
174. United States v. The M. V. Atlantic Reefer, 221 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir.
1955); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 202
(2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 579. See MAGuIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT
179 (1959).
175. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648, 650 (D.N.J. 1930).
But the bill to suppress was retained because of the possibility of criminal punish-
ment, penalties, forfeiture.
176. Nan v. Rasmusson, 1 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mont. 1932).
177. In re Andrew's Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1937).
178. Schenck ex rel. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D.
Mass. 1938).
179. Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
180. Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449, 450 (7th Cir. 1949).
181. United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949). There had been
an acquittal in the criminal proceeding. See also United States v. $4,171.00 in
United States Currency, 200 F. Supp. 28, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1961); United States
v. One 1953 Oldsmobile Sedan, 132 F. Supp. 14, 18 (W.D. Ark. 1955) ; Note, 48
IOWA L. REV. 710, 713-14 (1963).
182. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949).
183. Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962), noted 48 IOWA
19641
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
state court adhered to the traditional view that the search and
seizure doctrine does not apply to civil litigation between pri-
vate parties, I' 4 reversing a contrary lower court holding. 8 5 A
husband suing for divorce had obtained evidence by unlawful
search and seizure.
INVASION OF THE HUMAN BODY
In recent years a number of cases have involved the search
and seizure problem raised by the invasion of the human body. 8 6
Where there was a forcible extraction of a cache of narcotics
from the defendant's rectum, the evidence was not excluded on
self-incrimination or due process grounds under the fifth
amendment. l 7 The fourth amendment was not violated. 88 A
federal district court held that removal of narcotics from the
defendant's stomach by means of a stomach pump violated the
fourth amendment. 89 Where a fluoroscopic examination to
which no objection was made disclosed foreign objects in the
abdomen of a suspected smuggler, and castor oil and epsom
salts were administered and narcotics were then disgorged,
there was no violation of the fourth amendment nor of due
process under the fifth. 90 The defendants had after full explana-
tion consented to all that was done. It was held as lately as
1963 that administering emetics to cause vomiting in order to
recover narcotics is not an unreasonable search of the person
in violation of the fourth amendment; nor does it violate due
process of law under the fifth amendment.' 9 ' This is particu-
L. REV. 710 (1963) ; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 193-94 (1959) ; De Breuil,
Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963 DUKE LJ. 472, 487.
184. Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d dept.
1962), noted 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 168, 48 CORN. L.Q. 345, 31 FORDIIAM L. REV.
390.
185. Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
noted 46 MINN. L. REV. 1119, 11 S.C.L.Q. 433, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 13
SYRACUSE L. REV. 606, 8 UTAii L. REV. 84.
186. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 195-98 (1959) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2184a, at 48-51 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
187. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 914, noted 58 COLUM. L. REV. 565, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 9
MERCER L. REV. 220. One judge dissented.
188. 247 F.2d at 750.
189. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S. D. Cal. 1949), noted
2 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 52, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 418. But if the
defendant consented there is no violation. In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.
Tex. 1949). See Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 41 J. CnIM. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1950); Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 122
(1952).
190. United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1956), affirmed
sub nom., King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958).
191. Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1963).
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larly so if no force is used. Searches are unreasonable when
there is force and a series of unreasonable acts to the person
and property of the defendant. 192
When blood was found on the defendant's body in an exami-
nation to which he submitted under military order, the evidence
was held admissible without discussion of search and seizure. 193
On a prosecution for taking indecent liberties compulsory exam-
ination of the defendant's penis for a blood sample was held to
violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 194 The court
also suggested that there might have been an unreasonable
search and seizure. In a case holding that fingerprints taken
after an illegal arrest were not admissible in evidence, the court
invoked the fourth amendment and the McNabb-Mallory rule as
analogies. 195
STATUTES
Statutes were passed by Congress in 1789,196 1790,197 1791,198
and 1799199 authorizing search warrants on oath before justices
of the peace for day time searches for various types of contra-
band, such as tax-unpaid liquors. Subsequent statutes permitted
search warrants for books and papers relating to customs
fraud, 200 obscene literature, 201 and counterfeit money.20 2 Only as
late as 1917203 was there enacted a general search warrant pro-
vision allowing search for stolen grounds or property used in
the commission of a felony. 20 4
Under an act of Congress passed in 1948 federal officers who
192. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), noted 66 HARv. L. REV.
122. A state conviction based on blood removed from the defendant while un-
conscious to determine intoxication does not come within the Rochin case.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Three Justices dissented.
193. McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 788.
194. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 384, 385 (D.D.C. 1957).
See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1413 (1952).
195. Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1959), noted 19
MD. L. REV. 265, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1330, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1392, 69 YALE L.J.
432.
196. 1 Stat. 43.
197. 1 Stat. 170.
198. 1 Stat. 207.
199. 1 Stat. 677.
200. 12 Stat. 740 (1863).
201. 28 Stat. 549 (1894).
202. 31 Stat. 1337 (1901).
203. 4 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 397 (1929) ; Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361, 380 (1921).
204. 40 Stat. 228. This statute largely resembled the law of New York.
United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
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participate in an unlawful search and seizure are guilty of a
misdemeanor. 20 5
For almost a century there were no decisions of the Supreme
Court on the fourth amendment. Only in 1886 was there a de-
cision containing comprehensive and searching discussion. 20 6
During a period from 1920 to 1927 there were 490 cases in the
federal courts on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence
in liquor cases. 20 7 World War I and the eighteenth amendment
focussed increasing attention on search and seizure. When the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were drafted the law was
sufficiently developed that rule 41 on search and seizure was
largely a restatement of existing law. The rule provides as fol-
lows:
"Rule 14. Search and Seizure
"(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant
authorized by this rule may be issued by a judge of the
United States or of a state, commonwealth or territorial
court of record or by a United States commissioner within
the distrct wherein the property sought is located. As amend-
ed Apr. 9, 1956, eff. July 8, 1956.
"(b) Grounds for Issuance. A warrant may be issued
under this rule to search for and seize any property
"(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the
United States; or
"(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been
used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or
"(3) Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for
use or which is or has been used in violation of Title 18,
U.S.C., § 957.
"(c) Issuance and Contents. A warrant shall issue only
on affidavit sworn to before the judge or commissioner and
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the
205. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2236 (1948). See Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751,
757 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
206. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The history of the adoption
of the fourth amendment is discussed by Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361-66 (1921) ; Reynard, Freedom from Unreason-
able Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L. 3.
259, 262-77 (1950).
207. Note, 36 YALE L.J. 536, 537 n.2 (1927). See also Annot., 39 A.L.R. 811
(1925).
[Vol. XXIV
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the ap-
plication exist or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property
and naming or describing the person or place to be searched.
The warrant shall be directed to a civil officer of the United
States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law
thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the
United States. It shall state the grounds or probable cause
for its issuance and the names of the persons whose affi-
davits have been taken in support thereof. It shall command
the officer to search forthwith the person or place named
for the property specified. The warrant shall direct that it
be served in the daytime, but if the affidavits are positive
that the property is on the person or in the place to be
searched, the warrant may direct that it be served at any
time. It shall designate the district judge or the commis-
sioner to whom it shall be returned.
"(d) Execution and Return with Inventory. The war-
rant may be executed and returned only within 10 days after
its date. The officer taking property under the warrant shall
give to the person from whom or from whose premises the
property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for
the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the
place from which the property was taken. The return shall
be made promptly and shall be accompanied by a written
inventory of any property taken. The inventory shall be
made in the presence of the applicant for the warrant and
the person from whose possession or premises the property
was taken, if they are present, or in the presence of at least
one credible person other than the applicant for the warrant
or the person from whose possession or premises the prop-
erty was taken, and shall be verified by the officer. The
judge or commissioner shall upon request deliver a copy of
the inventory to the person from whom or from whose
premises the property was taken and to the applicant for the
warrant.
"(e) Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress
Evidence. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the district court for the district in which
the property was seized for the return of the property and
to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained on
1964]
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the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized with-
out warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face,
or (3) the property seized is not that described in the war-
rant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the
existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued,
or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall
receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the de-
cision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property
shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention
and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or
trial. The motion to suppress evidence may also be made in
the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor
did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds
for which special provision is made. The term 'property' is
the motion at the trial or hearing.
"(f) Return of Papers to Clerk. The judge or commis-
sioner who has issued a search warrant shall attach to the
warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other papers
in connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk of
the district court for the district in which the property was
seized.
"(g) Scope and Definition. This rule does not modify
any act, inconsistent with it, regulating search, seizure and
issuance and execution of search warrants in circumstances
for which special provision is made. The term 'property' is
used in this rule to include documents, books, papers and any
other tangible objects. As amended Dec. 27, 1948, eff. Oct.
20, 1949."
HISTORY OF DRAFTING RULE 41
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
contained no provisions on search and seizure. The second draft,
dated January 12, 1942, in its rule 105 covered search warrants.
Subsection (a) covered authority to issue warrants, and was
based on 18 U.S.C. sections 611 and 612. Subsection (b) cov-
ered manner of issuance and was based on 18 U.S.C. sections
613-616, 620, 621, 623, and 624. While 18 U.S.C. section 613 re-
quired that the warrant shall "particularly describe" the prop-
erty and the place to be searched, this draft substituted the word
"identify," since an error in description which nevertheless does
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not present identification of the place should not nullify the
search warrant. Rule 106 covered motion to quash search war-
rants and to suppress evidence. It was based largely on 18 U.S.C.
sections 625 and 626. In addition it sought to clarify the pro-
cedure relating to the suppression of evidence. Rule 85 of the
third draft, dated March 1942, was based on rule 105 of the sec-
ond draft. The rule was revised to permit issuance of a search
warrant for property used as a means of committing a "crime"
instead of a felony. Several existing statutes covered cases
where the property involved was used in the commission of a
misdemeanor. Rule 86 was based on rule 106 of the second
draft. In the fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, the rules were
combined into a single rule, rule 34, entitled "Search Warrants."
Rule 34 of a draft, known as "Preliminary Draft," dated
May 1942, made no important changes. It was submitted to the
Supreme Court for comment. The Court suggested that the an-
notation indicate how far the rule follows and how far it departs
from the present statute. The Court thought the word "posi-
tive" when read in its context to be of dubious meaning in the
following sentence: "The warrant shall direct that it be served
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or depositions are positive
that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched,
in which event it may direct that it be served at any time of the
day or night." The Court made a similar criticism of the word
"publicly" in the following sentence: "The inventory shall be
made publicly or in the presence of the person from whose pos-
session or premises the property was taken and shall be verified
by the affidavit of an officer." Finally the Court queried
whether there should not be discretionary power in the Court
to permit a defendant to make a motion to suppress evidence at
the trial or hearing.
The fifth draft dated June 1942 in its rule 34 made no sub-
stantial changes. The committee annotation pointed out that
the rule is designed to incorporate the substance of existing law,
except that provision is made for review by the district court of
a decision by a commissioner or issuing judge on a motion for
return or suppression of evidence.
The sixth draft, dated Winter 1942, in its rule 33 now con-
tained a subdivision (b) on grounds for issue of a search war-
rant. Subdivision (c) now covered issue and contents. Subdi-
vision (d) now covered execution and return with inventory.
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Subdivision (e) now covered motion for return of seized prop-
erty and to suppress evidence. Subdivision (f) covered scope of
the rule. While the Court had criticized the word "positive"
search for a better word was unsuccessful. But the rule adopted
the Court's suggestion that the court have discretionary power
to suppress evidence on motion made as late as the trial or
hearing. The Reporter preferred the following rule: A motion
to suppress evidence shall be made at the arraignment of the
defendant upon a charge clearly involving such evidence or at
such other time as the court or these rules may provide.
Rule 33 of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May 1943, had
a new title which became the final title of the rule: "Search and
Seizure." The prior title had been "Search Warrant." Other-
wise the rule was substantially the same as the sixth draft.
Many comments were received by the Committee on the pro-
posed rule. William Scott Stewart of Chicago contended that
the rule limited the right of a person to be secure only as against
seizure of property claimed by him.208 Provision should be made
for the suppression of all evidence illegally seized, as well as
information obtained in such illegal manner.
With respect to subdivision (a) Thomas J. Morrissey, United
States Attorney for the District of Colorado, stated that search
warrants should not be issued by state or territorial courts; and
application therefor should require the approval of the United
States Attorney or one of his assistants.20 9
With respect to subdivision (b) M. Neil Andrews, United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, suggested
that if constitutional provisions do not preclude it, language
should be added to the rule providing that books, records and
documents containing evidence of commission of a criminal of-
fense may be seized by search warrant.210 The word "property"
as used in the rule does not expand the present law. Judge
Harry J. Lemley of Arkansas suggests that the language "de-
signed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense" might be construed to
empower the courts to issue a warrant even when a crime is
merely intended to be committed in the future.211 In such a case
208. 1 COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERN-
ING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 206 (1943).
209. 2 id. 488.
210. 2 id. 487.
211. 2 id. 489.
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there would be no probable cause, although the Constitution re-
quires probable cause. Stuart H. Steinbrink of New York as-
serted that either the title, grounds for issuance, or the phrase-
ology is erroneous since the text describes the property which
may be searched rather than the conditions under which a
search warrant may be issued.
With respect to subdivision (c) Judge Leslie R. Darr of Ten-
nessee pointed out that often criminals use automobiles and
other methods of fast transportation, hence there should be a
provision permitting search for property that is in transit when
the warrant issues upon probable cause, that is, search in the
night time.2 12 Sterling Hutcheson, United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of Virginia, would leave search at night in
the discretion of the court.2 13 Robert M. Hitchcock of Dunkirk,
New York, would allow search at night upon affidavit or deposi-
tion showing good cause therefor. Judge Albert L. Reeves of
the Western District of Missouri pointed out that the rule re-
quires the judge or commissioner both to examine the applicant
for search warrant on oath and to require affidavits. 214 Only
one of the two should be required.
With respect to subdivision (d) Stuart H. Steinbrink thought
that the requirement of execution and return within ten days
unduly limited the officers.215 The return might well come later.
With respect to subdivision (e) several thought that a mo-
tion to suppress should not be heard by a commissioner. 216 One
sentence provided: "If the motion is granted, the property shall
be restored unless subject to confiscation and it shall not be ad-
missible in evidence at any hearing or trial of the proceeding
in connection with which the seizure occurred." To this sen-
tence Stuart H. Steinbrink would add: "or in connection with
the crime or crimes described in the application for the war-
rant." Robert M. Hitchcock would make it clear that the mo-
tion should be made only on affidavit of a person against whom
a warrant or subpoena has been issued, which affidavit must
state unequivocally that he is either (a) the owner of the prop-
erty or (b) the possessor thereof at the time of the search or
212. 2 id. 490.
213. 1 id. 207.
214. 1 id. 206.
215. 2 id. 491.
216. 2 id. 492-93.
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seizure. 217 Judge Edwin R. Holmes of the Court of Appeals of
the Fifth Circuit would substitute the word "was" for "is" in
the phraseology "There is not probable cause for believing the
existence of the grounds, on which the warrant was issued."
F. B. McConaughy of Cincinnati would have the rule include the
written confession or statement covered by rule 5(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.218 The rule should also
cover the return and suppression of copies of and memoranda
made from evidence illegally procured and the matter of in-
junctive relief concerning the use of the same. There are numer-
ous decisions by the Supreme Court and by lower federal courts
on these matters. As to the language "the property seized is not
that described in the warrant," Robert M. Hitchcock thought it
too rigid.21 9 The property seized should be of the same character
described in the warrant, and not necessarily precisely that so
described.
With respect to subdivision (f) on scope and definition the
proposed rule provides it "does not modify or impair any other
Act, inconsistent with this rule." Judge Edwin B. Holmes would
substitute: "It shall not modify or impair. ' 220
Rule 41 of the Second Preliminary Draft, dated February
1944, made some changes. Subdivision (a) attained its final
form, as did subdivision (c). Subdivision (d) had attained its
final form in the First Preliminary Draft. Subdivision (e) used
the language "there was not probable cause," whereas the prior
draft used the word "is" instead of "was." The subdivision on
scope and definition attained its final form. There were a num-
ber of comments by the Advisory Commmittee on the draft.
With respect to subdivision (b) the Special Committee of the
Oregon State Bar thought to be unclear the language "constitut-
ing the fruits of a violation of a law of the United States. '221
Possibly this could be interpreted to mean that if an individual
were charged with income tax evasion, a search warrant could
be issued and his money seized or even any property he pur-
chased with the money. Possibly the property could be seized
even though it were in the hands of an innocent third person.
217. 1 id. 208.
218. He cited Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
219. 1 id. 209.
220. 1 id. 210.
221. 3 id. 170 (1944).
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Various federal agencies have very wide powers. The present
statute should be substituted for the proposed rule.
With respect to subdivision (d) the language requiring re-
turn within ten days was thought to be too strict by the Com-
mittee for the Eastern District of Tennessee.222 Execution
should be within ten days after the date of the warrant, but not
return. It is easy to forget to make the return. There is rarely
prejudice to the defendant because of a late return.
With respect to subdivision (d) Judge Charles E. Clark sug-
gested that the hearing be held before a district judge and not
before a commissioner. 223 With respect to the sentence provid-
ing that the judge "take testimony" Judge Jerome Frank pro-
posed to substitute "receive evidence." This suggestion was in-
corporated in the Final Report of the Advisory Committee.
Judge Swan would provide that the judge may hear the motion
upon affidavit or upon testimony. The New York County Law-
yers Association Committees on Federal Courts and Criminal
Courts opposed review by the district court of the ruling of the
judge. If the same judge were involved, the decision would rare-
ly be overruled. If a different judge were involved, the rule
that the decision of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction will not
be reviewed in the same court should apply. A similar criticism
was made by the Committee on Criminal Courts, Law and Pro-
cedure of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.224
Ralph F. Lesemann of the Bar Committee of the Seventh Cir-
cuit would have the hearing only before the district court.225
The questions of law involved are usually close, important and
vital. Allowing hearing before a commissioner would result
only in delay. A similar view was taken at the Conference of
United States Attorneys at Saint Louis, Missouri.
The Final Report of the Advisory Committee, dated June
1944, made some changes. The rule was now numbered 43. A
new subdivision (f) entitled "Return of Papers to Clerk" was
added in final form; and the subdivision on scope and defini-
tion, "f," became "g." Subdivision (e) now used the language
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" instead
of "A person whose property has been seized under a warrant."
222. 3 id. 172. The committee cited Bragg v. State, 155 Tenn. 20, 290 S.W. 1
(1927).
223. 3 id. 173.
224. 3 id. 174.
225. 4 id. 84.
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The Commissioner could no longer conduct the hearing. The
provision for review of ruling on the motion in the district court
was deleted. The Supreme Court adopted this draft without
any important changes. The Supreme Court substituted for
(b) (1) the language "stolen or embezzled in violation of the
laws of the United States" instead of "constituting the fruits of
a violation of a law of the United States." As two rules sug-
gested by the Committee were rejected by the Court the rule be-
came rule 41.
Rule 41 (b) (3) and rule 41 (g) were amended in 1948 to sub-
stitute proper reference to Title 18 in place of the repealed acts
and to eliminate reference to sections of the Act of June 15,
1917, c. 30, which have been repealed by the Act of June 25,
1948, c. 645, which enacted Title 18. Rule 41(a) was amended
in 1956 to allow issuance of search warrants by judges of com-
monwealth courts.
RULE 41 As CONSTRUED IN THE CASES
By this time there are a large number of cases construing
rule 41. The balance of this paper will be devoted to a survey
of such cases.22
6
Authority to Issue Warrant
A justice of the peace has no authority to issue a search war-
rant under rule 41 (a) .227 A federal search is governed by rule
41 and not by state law. 28
Where a search warrant is issued by a state judge whether
such a warrant is valid beyond the judicial circuit of its issuance
depends on the language of the State Constitution or statutes. 229
One court has held that the word "district" in rule 41 (a) refers
to the state jurisdictional limitation. 230
226. Decisions before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure will often be found useful. See 18 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure Rules 32-end, at 215-291 (1961); 4 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDEAT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2401-2408 (1951); MATTHEWS, How To TRY A
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE 102-62 (1960) ; 5 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
396-411 (1929); VARON, SE.ARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (1961); COR-
NELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1926).
227. United States v. Brougher, 19 F.R.D. 79, 82 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
228. Ibid. See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) ; United
States v. Brown, 151 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D. Va. 1957).
229. United States v. Muncey, 185 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
230. Application of Houlihan, 31 F.R.D. 145, 148 (D.N.D. 1962).
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Grounds For Issuance
A corporation's papers could be found to be the "means for
committing a criminal offense" though some of the papers were
legitimate records and were not per se harmful or dangerous,
and though some had not been exhibited to the government.21'
Where the affidavit proceeds on the theory that the crime was
committed apart from obscene pictures and books and did not
show that they were the means of committing the crime of con-
spiracy, the search warrant is not valid. 232 Number slips, tip
sheets, tapes, and money are gambling paraphernalia and as
such are instrumentalities used in wagering.2 33
Issuance and Contents
In general rule 41 (c) is merely a codification of the prior
law.23 4 A search warrant closely following form 15 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure is valid.233 The validity of a
search warrant is tested by federal estandards, not state. 23 (6
A court has stated that the "oath or affirmation is required
to be in the form of an affidavit or oath in writing. '237 The
affidavit need not be typed up by the commissioner.23 8 It may
be prepared by the government officer. Rule 41(c) does not
require that a copy of the affidavit be annexed to or inserted in
the warrant.239 The affidavit must set forth facts showing
probable cause, and not merely the conclusions of the affiant.240
The owner of the premises to be searched need not be specified
in the affidavit where the search is of the premises and not the
person. 2
41
231. United States v. Labovitz, 20 F.R.D. 307, 309 (D. Mass. 1957).
232. United States v. Loft on 6th Floor of Building, etc., 182 F. Supp. 322,
324 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
233. United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 210 F. Supp. 45,
51 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
234. United States v. Stewart, 79 F. Supp. 313, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1948). The
Advisory Committee note so states. See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435
(1925).
235. United States v. Klaholz, 17 F.R.D. 18, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
236. United States v. Elliott, 210 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1962).
237. United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
238. United States v. Purgitt, 176 F. Supp. 557, 558 (D.D.C. 1959).
239. Ledbetter v. United States, 211 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
74 Sup. Ct. 789. This is true in the District of Columbia despite a contrary
statute in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 23-301 (1951).
240. United States v. Office No. 508 Ricou-Brewster Bldg., 119 F. Supp. 24,
27 (W.D. La. 1954). The practice of joint affidavits is undesirable. Masiello v.
United States, 304 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But a joint affidavit may be
valid where it clearly specifies which items of information were known by each
of the affiants, United States v. Castle, 213 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1962).
241. United States v. Bell, 17 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 1955).
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The affidavit mentioned in rule 41(c) is required only to
establish the grounds for issuing the warrant and to show prob-
able cause therefor.2 42 But it need not particularly describe the
place to be searched or the things to be seized. Sole reliance on
the affidavit must be had as to the existence of probable
cause.243 That is to say probable cause must be shown in the
affidavit. 244 According to one case the commissioner or judge
may take the affidavit as it is presented, and need not investi-
gate whether its statements are true.245
In a much quoted definition of probable cause the Supreme
Court stated that it was facts and circumstances within the
police officer's knowledge "and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information . . . sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that an offense
had been or was being committed. 246 In a dissenting opinion
Justice Jackson suggested that a lower degree of probable
cause 247 should be necessary in searches involving more serious
offenses. 248 In a case in which the court found no entrapment
it suggested in dictum that a search warrant could be based
on evidence gained by entrapment. 249 Where the evidence is un-
disputed the question whether probable cause exists for the
issuance of a search warrant is for the court, and not a jury
issue.250
A search warrant should not issue on affidavit of a govern-
242. Lowrey v. United States, 161 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849. See also United States v. Stewart, 79 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa.
1948).
243. United States v. Nichols, 89 F. Supp. 953, 955 (W.D. Ark 1950).
But see Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
78 Sup. Ct. 96; Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1962)
(arguendo).
244. United States v. Sims, 201 F. Supp. 405, 408 (M.D. Tenn. 1962)
Tripodi v. Morgenthau, 213 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
245. United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
246. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). See Note, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 154 (1960) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)
United States v. Egerov, 222 F. Supp. 862, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
247. United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See
Note, The "Probable Cause" Requirements for Search Warrants, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 1307 (1933).
248. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
249. Fletcher v. United States, 295 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1961), noted
50 GEo. L.J. 610. One judge dissented.
250. Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1951). See Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1925); 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2550
(3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1933), concluding broadly
that determination of probable cause is for the court whether the evidence is dis-
puted or not.
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ment officer merely showing that he has possession of informa-
tion which gives him cause to believe that the defendant is in
possession of property in violation of the criminal law without
revealing the sources of his information or the grounds of his
belief.2 51 In 1960 the sufficiency of a search warrant was at-
tacked on the ground that its issuance was based on hearsay
evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the warrant and held
specifically that "hearsay may be the basis for a warrant. '2 2
But the affiant must still have personal knowledge; and the
affidavit must include some factual information independently
corroborative of the hearsay report.253
A search warrant is not invalid merely because the United
States Attorney gave his approval to the complainants to secure
the warrant.2 54
The affiant's name must be stated in the search warrant.2 55
Someone must take the responsibility for the facts alleged show-
ing probable cause. The defendant must be given an opportunity
to probe and challenge the warrant. The search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized to satisfy the fourth
amendment. 26 All that is required as a description of the prem-
ises to be searched is that the description suffice to enable
officers to ascertain and identify the place intended by reason-
able effort.257 A warrant describing an entire building when
cause is shown for searching only one room or apartment is void
as violating the fourth amendment. 258
251. Baysden v. United States, 271 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1959). See
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
252. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960), noted 74 HARv. L.
REV. 151. Justice Douglas dissented. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950). For
an earlier contrary view see Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932),
Justices Stone and Cardozo dissenting. The earlier view is criticized by Paulsen,
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 66 (1957) ;
Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1933); Note, 21 Ky. L.J. 480 (1932).
See also United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 1962) ; United
States v. Spears, 287 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Plemmons, 222
F. Supp. 853, 854 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) ; United States v. Jacobson, 198 F. Supp.
386, 387 (D. Conn. 1961).
253. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
254. United States v. Purgitt, 176 F. Supp. 557, 558 (D.D.C. 1959).
255. King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
256. Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 49 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
257. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) ; United States v. Pisano,
191 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp.
539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
258. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955) ; United
States v. Brown, 151 F. Supp. 441, 444 (E.D. Va. 1957).
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Where the warrant is not directed to an authorized civil of-
ficer of the United States, it may be quashed. 2 9 Revenue agents
have authority to execute search warrants. 20
The language as to search "forthwith" in rule 41 (c) is sub-
ject to the provision for execution and return within ten days
in rule 41 (d) .261
The search warrant is not invalid because it does not contain
a direction that it be executed within ten days after its issu-
ance.
262
Under rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure warrants may be isued on "probable cause" for searches
during the daytime but searches after dark require "positive"
information. In 1956 Congress passed a statute263 as to search
for narcotics under which "probable cause" is sufficient for
nighttime searches. But if such search is to be at nighttime the
warrant must so provide. If it does not, the warrant cannot be
served at night.264
The word "positive" as to nighttime searches requires
nothing more than an explicit statement, supported by positive
evidence, as distinguished from negative evidence, that the
property is in the place to be searched, and requires averments
of fact sufficiently persuasive to support a reasonable inference
that the property is on the premises to be searched. 265 The rule
on nighttime search "is hardly compatible with a principle that
a search without a warrant can be based merely on probable
cause.
26 6
Even though the return seems to indicate nighttime search,
it may be shown that the search began in the daytime.26 7 The
entry could mean the time at which the search and inventory
259. United States v. Troop, 235 F.2d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1956).
260. United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 210 F. Supp. 45,
51 (W.D. Pa. 1962) ; Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 52 (E.D. Wis.
1962).
261. Mitchell v. United States, 258 F.2d 435, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But see
the opinion of Judge Bazelon id. at 440, n.l1.
262. People v. Santora, 233 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962)
Benton v. United States, 70 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1954).
263. 70 Stat. 573 (1956), 18 U.S.C. § 1405 (1958).
264. United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742, 744 (3d Cir. 1961).
265. United States v. Daniels, 10 F.R.D. 225, 228 (D.N.J. 1950). See also
Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1951) ; People v. Santora,
233 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
266. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
267. United States v. Bell, 17 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 1955).
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was completed, or the time when search began. A search be-
ginning in the daytime and extending into the night is valid.268
Execution and Return With Inventory
Rule 41 (d) provides that the warrant "may be executed and
returned only within 10 days after its date. '269 But the un-
availability of the search warrant and affidavit at the trial did
not require the granting of a new trial on the ground that one
defendant was thereby deprived of his right to cross-examine
the treasury agent who, with another, executed the affidavit
when the variance between the affidavit, which was found after
trial, and the testimony by such agent at the trial, was trivial.270
Where the defendants although present when the premises
were searched under a warrant made no claim to the property
and disavowed any interest in the premises, they had no right
to be served with a copy of the warrant and could not claim that
the copy left on the premises was defective.2 1
A mere failure to leave a copy of the warrant and receipt
for the property taken does not make the warrant invalid.2 2
But the defendant's motion to suppress may be granted unless
the government complies within a ten-day period. 273
The return of a search warrant should not include a bribe
offered an officer when he went on the premises to execute a
warrant.274 Hence, when such a warrant is quashed the govern-
ment need not return the bribe. The return and inventory need
not list items which were not seized under the search warrant.278
The return of a search warrant is a ministerial act and any
failure therein does not void the warrant.27 6
268. United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 545 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
269. A search warrant executed after two days is valid. United States v.
Klaphady, 17 F.R.D. 18, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). If executed after ten days it is
invalid. United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Tenn. 1956) See Sgro v.
United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932).
270. United States v. Giallo, 206 F.2d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1953). See also
Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
271. Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74
Sup. Ct. 430.
272. United States v. Klapholz, 17 F.R.D. 18, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
273. United States v. Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
274. United States v. Troop, 235 F.2d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1956).
275. United States v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
276. Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Sims, 202 P. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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Motion for Return of Property and To Suppress Evidence
Rule 41 (e) "codifies existing law and practice. ' '277 "The one
change the rule makes is that it abolishes the existing authority
of the United States Commissioners to hear motions to suppress
evidence."
27
In general a defendant should proceed by motion to suppress
under rule 41(e) rather than by preindictment equitable pro-
ceedings. 279
Proceedings under rule 41(e) are governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when no prosecution has yet begun.28 0
An impounding order does not necessarily involve a search
or seizure, hence a motion to suppress does not always lie.28'
The early cases were reluctant to grant motions to suppress
involuntary confessions.2 8 2 In one case the court entertained a
motion before trial, but denied the motion as the confession was
found voluntary.2 8 3 There have been cases suppressing a state-
ment obtained from the defendant in the course of an illegal
search and seizure. 28 4
In 1947 the Second Circuit held by a two to one vote that
confessions resulting from violation of constitutional right may
be suppressed in advance of trial and of indictment.28 5 A court
277. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129, n.9 (1962) ; United States
v. Quinn, 17 F.R.D. 342, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
278. Judge Holtzoff in 6 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 130 (1946). See
the Advisory Committee note.
279. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 12, 128 (1962) ; Toscano v. Olesen,
184 F. Supp. 296, 297 (S.D. Cal. 1960) ; Rodgers v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
670, 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
280. Greene v. United States, 296 F.2d 841, n.1, 843 (2d Cir. 1961); Russo
v. United States, 241 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816.
Compare Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1963).
281. United States v. Ponder, 238 F.2d 825, 827, 829 (4th Cir. 1956). See
Hagan, Impounding and the Subpoena Duces Tecum, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 199
(1960).
282. United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976, 978 (W.D.N.Y. 1921). But
the motion was made after indictment.
283. Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805, 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1937).
284. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1933) ; United States v. Pollack,
64 F. Supp. 554 (D.N.J. 1946). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 486 (1963); Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous
Incriminating Statements: A dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure,
1961 U. ILL. L. FORUM 78, 84-96.
285. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458, 1 A.L.R.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1947), writ of
certiorari dismissed on motion of petitioner, 322 U.S. 807, noted 60 HIARv. L. REV.
1145, 22 IND. L.J. 267, 38 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 509, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 681,
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denied suppression of a confession after an indictment had been
returned ;280 and expressed objection to the practice even before
indictment.28 7  In 1954 a district court held that a defendant
may move under rule 41 (e) to suppress a statement on the
ground that it was obtained while he was illegally detained in
violation of the McNabb doctrine and that it was involutary.2 8
In 1956 the Second Circuit upheld28 9 suppression of confession
obtained in violation of the McNabb rule on the basis of a de-
cision of the Supreme Court,290 and not on the basis of rule
41(e). On a motion to dismiss an indictment for perjury on
the ground that false testimony had been obtained in violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination the court of appeals
remarked that the trial court might properly conduct a pretrial
hearing to determine a collateral issue as to suppression of evi-
dence for any reason.291 On analogy to rule 41(e) a federal
court has suppressed information gathered by internal revenue
agents as to certain years in violation of a statute restricting
examination of taxpayers. 292 "The distinction which isolates for
special treatment fourth amendment violations has no basis in
reason; instead it seems rooted in the fortuities of historical
growth. '293 Considerable expansion of the motion to suppress
may be anticipated.
Only the district court may pass on a motion to suppress
and on the admissibility at trial of evidence obtained by illegal
56 YALE L.J. 1076. See in accord, Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 225 F.2d
394, 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356, 358 (4th
Cir. 1961) (one judge dissenting). See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 147 (1959)
Note, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 594-95 (1963).
286. United States v. Apuzzo, 9 F.R.D. 466 (D.N.J. 1949). But see United
States v. Carabasi, 218 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (after information filed).
287. See also Biggs v. United States, 246 F.2d 140, 142 (6th Cir. 1957);
Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913;
Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657, 659 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Centracchio
v. Garitty, 198 F.2d 382, 387 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d
788, 789 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Rodgers v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 670, 682
(S.D. Cal. 1958); United States v. Marshall, 24 F.R.D. 505 (D.D.C. 1960).
288. United States v. Skeeters, 122 F. Supp. 52, 56, 58 (S.D. Calif. 1954).
289. United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494, 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 124, noted 42 VA. L. REV. 833, 66 YALE L.J. 270. See
Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19
U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 559-61 (1958) ; Watson v. United States, 249 F.2d 106,
107 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
290. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
291. United States v. Orta, 253 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 905. See also United States v. Wheeler, 172 F. Supp. 278, 279 (W.D.
Pa. 1959).
292. Application of Leonardo, 208 F. Supp. 124, 126 (N.D. Calif. 1962).
293. Note, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 593 (1963).
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search and seizure. 29 4 This is the most important change made
by rule 41 (e) in the prior law.295
The motion to suppress must be made in the district in which
the property was seized. It may not be made in a district in
which there merely was a search.2 96 The court of the district
of seizure may deny a motion to suppress where trial is to be
in a district in another state. 29T A suppression order rendered in
the district of seizure is not necessarily binding in the district
of trial.298
Rule 41(e) does not change the rule that a sole stockholder
may not take on the privilege of the corporation against un-
lawful searches and seizures according to an early case.299 But
a later case seems to apply a contrary rule. °° A defendant has
no standing to complain of his wife's arrest, or of seizure of
evidence in the form of certain money taken from her purse,
where the defendant did not claim ownership of the money. 01
A motion to suppress should be in writing,30 2 but need not
be verified.
The motion to suppress should be accompanied by affidavit,
but possibly this is not true when the motion is on the ground
that the warrant is insufficient on its face.803 But in general
affidavits should not be filed either by the defendants or by the
government.30 4 Rule 41 is silent as to affidavit; hence no af-
fidavit should be required although they may be permitted.30 5
Usually the pretrial motion is decided on affidavits alone.8°°
The point can, and on occasion must be, renewed at trial to
preserve it for ultimate appeal.
294. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 484 (1958).
295. See note 278 supra.
296. United States v. Oliver, 140 F. Supp. 808, 815 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
297. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 132 (1962) ; United States v.
Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 30
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
298. United States v. Koenig, 290 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1961).
299. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946).
300. Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1961). See also
United States v. Hopps, 215 F. Supp. 734, 748 (D. Md. 1962).
301. Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277, 280 (9th Cir. 1961).
302. United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 30 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
303. United States v. Vomero, 6 F.R.D. 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). See also
United States v. Privinzini, 6 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), holding that under
rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the filing of an affidavit is
optional, but the court may in its discretion require an affidavit.
304. United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 28, 30 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
305. United States v. Labovitz, 20 F.R.D. 3 (D. Mass. 1956) ; United States
v. Okawa, 26 F.R.D. 384, 386, n.2 (D. Hawaii 1961).
306. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129, n.9 (1962).
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The government need not file any formal answer, return or
reply to a motion to suppress. 0 7
A motion to suppress may not be used by either the defend-
ant or the government as a "fishing expedition to peer into the
files of the opponent."308
The government can cross-examine the defendant only if he
should voluntarily submit himself as a witness. 0 9
Questions arising under rule 41(e), especially competency
of evidence are for the court and not the jury.8 10 The right to
trial by jury is not violated by having the court pass on the
issue. 11
The burden of proof is on a defendant who seeks to suppress
evidence obtained under a regularly issued warrant to show the
want of probable cause. 1 2 The defendant must support his mo-
tion to suppress "by a prima facie showing" that his motion
has merit. 31
Pending a hearing on the motion to suppress the district
court does not have unlimited discretion to stay the government
from presenting evidence to a grand jury. 1 4 There should be
no hearing on the motion to suppress except when the petition
alleges facts which if proved would require relief. The hearing
when held should be held at an early date especially when the
statute of limitations might otherwise run. If the court abuses
its discretion by ordering a hearing or a stay the court of ap-
307. United States v. Okawa, 26 F.R.D. 384, 386 (D. Hawaii 1961).
308. United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 30 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
309. Ibid. Likewise on a motion to dismiss an information count the court
should not call the defendant to the stand and ask him incriminating questions.
Buenaventura v. United States, 291 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1961). See Orfield,
Competency of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 324,
334-35 (1963).
310. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925) ; Burris v. United
States, 192 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Wheeler, 172 F.
Supp. 278, 281 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
311. Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 112 (1927) ; People v. DuBois,
221 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24-25 (Queens County Ct. 1961).
312. Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Batten
v. United States, 188 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Nagle, 34
F.2d 952, 954 (N.D.N.Y. 1929) ; United States v. Lipschitz, 132 F. Supp. 519,
522 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) ; United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d 898, 904 (N.D.N.Y.
1928) ; People v. DuBois, 221 N.Y.S.2d 21, 27 (Queens County Ct. 1961) ; People
v. Manasek, 225 N.Y.S.2d 673, 680 (Westchester County Ct. 1961).
313. United States v. Okawa, 26 F.R.D. 384, 386 (D. Hawaii 1961); United
States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 29, 30 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
314. Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 1960), noted 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 941 (1961). One judge dissented. See also Greene v.
United States, 296 F.2d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1961).
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peals may grant mandamus.3 15 The problem seems to arise in
cases involving tax records.
Where a federal narcotics agent obtained evidence for a
federal prosecution in the course of an illegal search and seizure
and the evidence was suppressed in federal court, an injunction
will be granted against the agent to prevent him from testifying
concerning the evidence in a state court prosecution.3 16
In one case the court ordered return to the owner within
sixty days after the order to suppress unless the government
appealed.317 A defendant corporation has no right to return of
its books and records by the United States Attorney to whom
they were voluntarily turned over in a pending grand jury pro-
ceeding.3 18 There is no duty to return materials which might
be considered admissible in other prosecutions which might
grow out of the offense. 319 The government need not return
property illegally seized where such property is being used in
gambling activity in violation of the wagering tax law and is
subject to forfeiture. 320 A court may after suppressing evidence
direct that the money seized be retained in custody subject to
a federal tax lien and a final disposition thereof. 2 1 There need
be no return of property when, subsequent to the suppression
order but prior to its return, the property is levied upon by the
United States for collection of assessed taxes.3 22
The last sentence of rule 41(e) is merely a restatement of
the existing law which gave the defendant much protection. 323
Failure to make the motion to suppress before trial does not
show that the defendant had inadequate representation of
counsel.32
4
315. Mandamus was denied on the facts in United States v. Foley, 283 F.2d
582 (2d Cir. 1960).
316. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
317. Application of Houlihan, 31 F.R.D. 145, 149 (D.N.D. 1962).
318. United States v. Kyle, 20 F.R.D. 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
319. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849, 855 (D. Md. 1961).
320. United States v. Interbartolo, 192 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D. Mass. 1961)
United States v. Macri, 185 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Conn. 1960), noted 36 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 432.
321. Welsh v. United States, 220 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
322. Field v. United States, 263 F.2d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1959). See also
Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1961).
323. United States v. Sheba Bracelets, 248 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957) ; United States v. DiRe, 159 F.2d 818, 820 (2d
Cir. 1947).
324. United States v. Springfield, 178 F. Supp. 347, 349 (N.D. Calif. 1959)
United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102, 105 (E.D. Va. 1957).
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The motion to suppress may be made prior to indictment,425
or after indictment.3 26 The rule is silent as to the exact time
for making the motion. The motion may not be made subse-
quent to the trial.327 When defendant's counsel had been aware
of the seizure of the article two years before his motion to sup-
press, a motion made on the first day of trial may be denied. 28
The court will not assist a defendant who delays his motion for
strategic reasons.3 29 The defendant cannot secure return of the
property seized after trial under Rule 41 (e)o330
The defendant has no absolute right to have the motion to
suppress determined before trial. This is particularly true where
allowance of the motion would result in dismissal of the entire
proceedings.3 3 1
The phrase "was not aware of the grounds of the motion"
does not pertain to an awareness of the law, but rather refers
to a knowledge of the factual circumstances surrounding the
seizure. 332
Return of Papers to Clerk
One commissioner may issue a warrant and the warrant
may be returned to another commissioner when both commis-
sioners are appointed for the same district and may properly
act in any division of the district.333 The return of a warrant
is a ministerial act and any failure therein does not void the
warrant.
Appeal
Except by special legislation or under exceptional circum-
325. Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 387 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 866 (1952).
326. Rodgers v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 670, 677 (S.D. Calif. 1958).
327. United States v. Nirenberg, 19 F.R.D. 421, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). See
also United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v.
Shavin, 320 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1963).
328. United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 987 (1956). See also United States v. Chieppa, 241 F.2d 635, 638
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 931
(2d Cir. 1957).
329. United States v. Montalvo, 271 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1959).
330. Bartlett v. United States, 317 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1963).
331. United States v. Leiser, 16 F.R.D. 199 (D. Mass. 1954).
332. Isaacs v. United States, 283 F.2d 587, 589 (10th Cir. 1960). This case
arose after rejection of the "silver platter" doctrine.
333. Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957). The court
failed to make reference to the last sentence of rule 41(c) providing that the
warrant "shall designate the district judge or the commissioner to whom it shall
be returned."
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stances not fully defined, a motion under rule 41 (e) lacks the
independence of standing which would allow the party aggrieved
by the ruling upon it an immediate appeal. A post-indictment
order suppressing evidence may not be appealed by the Govern-
ment even though the order results in dismissal of the indict-
ment for lack of evidence. A defendant could not appeal at this
stage as the denial of his motion is interlocutory. Chief Justice
Warren stated: "Earlier cases illustrated, sometimes without
discussion, that under certain conditions orders for the suppres-
sion or return of illegally seized property are appealable at
once, as where the motion is made prior to indictment, or in a
different district from that in which the trial will occur, or
after dismissal of the case, or perhaps where the emphasis is
on the return of property rather than its suppression as evi-
dence. In such cases, as appropriate, the Government as well as
the moving person has been permitted to appeal from an adverse
decision."3 34
In 1962 the Supreme Court held that no appeal lay as to an
order granting or denying a pre-indictment motion to sup-
press. 3 5 It made no difference that the order was rendered in
a different district from that of trial.
A statute grants the government a right of appeal in nar-
cotics cases.336 In one case the court considered a government
appeal in a bootlegging case.3 3 7 No one appears to have noticed
the defect.
Motion to Vacate Sentence
Illegal search and seizure may not be raised for the first
time on motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255.338 There
is recent contrary authority.3 3 9
334. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1957), noted 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 612 (1958).
335. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962), noted 76 HARV. L. REV.
173, 22 MD. L. REv. 253, 37 TUL. L. REV. 145. See also Note, 35 TUL. L. REV.
794 (1961).
336. 18 U.S.C. § 1404 (1958).
337. United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1960).
338. United States v. De Fillo, 166 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The de-
fendant was represented by able counsel of his own choosing. See also Peters v.
United States, 312 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Jones v. United States, 258 F.2d
420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Springfield, 178 F. Supp. 347, 351
(N.D. Calif. 1959). See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788 (1963) ; Holtzoff, Col-
lateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REV. 26, 50 (1945).
339. United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1963), noted critic-
ally by Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378 (1964). See also In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949) ;
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Writ of Error Coram Nobis
The writ of error coram nobis was denied in a recent case. 40
Prior cases on coram nobis had not discussed the point . 41
Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus Upon Federal Judgments in Criminal
Cases, 23 WAsM. L. REV. 87, 100 (1948).
340. Jones v. United States, 258 F.2d 420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
341. Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 VILL. L. REv. 293, 350-
56 (1957).
